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International case studies 
A B S T R A C T   
‘Energy decentralisation’ means many things to many people. Among the confusion of definitions and practices 
that may be characterised as decentralisation, three broad causal narratives are commonly (implicitly or 
explicitly) invoked. These narratives imply that the process of decentralisation: i) will result in appropriate 
changes to rules and institutions, ii) will be more democratic and iii) is directly and causally linked to energy 
system decarbonisation. The principal aim of this paper is to critically examine these narratives. By con-
ceptualising energy decentralisation as a distinct class of socio-technical transition pathway, we present a 
comparative analysis of energy decentralisation in Cornwall, South West UK, the French island of Ushant and the 
National Electricity Market in Australia. We show that, while energy decentralisation is often strongly correlated 
with institutional change, increasing citizen agency in the energy system, and enhanced environmental perfor-
mance, these trends cannot be assumed as given. Indeed, some decentralisation pathways may entrench 
incumbent actors’ interests or block rapid decarbonisation. In particular, we show how institutional context is a 
key determinant of the link between energy decentralisation and normative goals such as democratisation and 
decarbonisation. While institutional theory suggests that changes in rules and institutions are often incremental 
and path-dependent, the dense legal and regulatory arrangements that develop around the electricity sector seem 
particularly resistant to adaptive change. Consequently, policymakers seeking to pursue normative goals such as 
democratisation or decarbonisation through energy decentralisation need to look beyond technology towards the 
rules, norms and laws that constitute the energy governance system.   
1. Introduction 
Energy decentralisation is nothing if not de rigueur, with the term 
used liberally across academic, policy and grey literature related to the 
energy system. The number of peer-reviewed energy publications with 
variants of decentralisation, decentralised or distributed as a keyword 
has grown significantly in the last few decades, with 1627 such articles 
published in 2018 alone.1 Despite wild variation in the use of the term 
(what is being decentralised, by whom and the implications of such a 
definition), implicit in much of the grey literature and some of the 
scholarly literature is a strong, causal association between energy de-
centralisation and progress towards sustainable, equitable energy sys-
tems [1]. This normative framing of the ‘rightness’ of decentralisation 
often rests on the reduced environmental impact of smaller-scale, more 
geographically distributed, and (usually) renewable energy generation 
technologies, an associated shift to distributed ownership and decision 
making, and greater autonomy of individuals in the energy system. As 
such, the concept of energy decentralisation often finds alignment with 
concepts of energy democracy and energy justice [2] 2 as well as 
decarbonisation. 
Here we make two points. The first is that ‘energy decentralisation’ 
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can have multiple interpretations, depending on what is decentralising – 
energy hardware, ownership, knowledge, socio-political power, 
decision-making authority, economic market share and so on [3]. Sec-
ondly, we posit that not all decentralisation pathways are created equal, 
and different decentralisation pathways can have quite different social 
and technological implications for the future energy system [4]. The 
starting point for this contribution is to observe that a single definition of 
energy decentralisation that can encompass the full diversity of practices 
bearing its name is likely to be so broad as to lose analytical precision. It 
is also unlikely that all of normative goals associated with energy de-
centralisation can be fully realised in all circumstances. 
Altogether, we argue that decentralisation is often symbolic, as much 
a narrative shorthand for the direction in which the energy system is (or 
should) be heading and the values that it ought to embody, as it is a 
descriptive or analytical device. Consequently energy decentralisation is 
something of a ‘floating signifier’ [5], an open category available for 
population by various actors and interests. Energy decentralisation, we 
suggest, may be considered an ‘energy fable’ among other energy “terms, 
ideas and stories …” whose “… conceptual foundations that have become 
invisible, worn smooth through use and submerged within familiar dis-
courses” [6]. That is not to suggest that the associations between energy 
decentralisation and normative goals are not valid. Indeed, a large body 
of energy research both theoretically and empirically supports many of 
these associations. However, we do argue that the conceptual mallea-
bility of the term and the wide range of practices that fall under the 
decentralisation umbrella invite further enquiry in order to develop a 
more detailed representation of what decentralisation is, and what it 
means. 
To this end, we develop three international case studies of purported 
energy decentralisation to offer a glimpse of how energy decentralisa-
tion is being enacted or, rather, what processes are being enacted in the 
name of decentralisation. Through these cases we are able to illustrate 
that how decentralisation is interpreted and enacted can have implica-
tions for sustainable energy. 
The remainder of this contribution proceeds as follow: section 2 re-
views existing literature addressing the topic of energy decentralisation; 
section 3 develops an analytical approach to energy decentralisation and 
puts forward the research question that guides the empirical analysis for 
three cases of decentralisation, presented in section 4. Section 5 reflects 
on the findings in light of contemporary theoretical discussions. Section 
6 concludes and proposes avenues for further research. 
2. Defining decentralisation 
While the importance of decentralisation for energy decarbonisation 
is becoming more widely recognised, there remains no commonly 
accepted definition of the term with definitions shifting in relation to the 
context [7,8]. Given the complexity of the phenomenon, definitions 
often reflect the particular facet(s) of decentralisation analysed in 
different studies; for example renewable generation technologies, 
ownership, or community energy [8–10]. Across different foci, decen-
tralisation is commonly presented as a counterpoint to ‘centralised’ 
energy, the differentiation being that decentralised energy production 
occurs closer to points of consumption. However, the lack of a single 
agreed definition gives rise to several ambiguities. Firstly, both aca-
demic and grey literature use the terms ‘decentralised’ and ‘distributed’ 
interchangeably [11,12]. Secondly, the term decentralisation is used 
interchangeably to refer to both processes and normative end goals, 
particularly when used in conjunction with discussions regarding energy 
democracy or community energy [13,14]. Thirdly, due to a higher 
volume of activity in this area, the term energy decentralisation is often 
applied primarily to electricity decentralisation, despite that over half of 
global energy consumption is actually for heat [15]. While around 43% 
of heat use in buildings globally is classed as renewable, this is primarily 
linked to the use of biomass for cooking and space heating in developing 
and emerging economies [15]. The removal of fossil fuels from heating, 
in order to meet the Paris agreement goals, requires the rapid deploy-
ment of more distributed heating technologies such as heat pumps and 
solar thermal (dependent on geography [16]). 
Within the electricity sector, decentralisation literature to date has 
primarily focussed on electricity generation [17–19]. Given the 
increasing importance of technologies associated with flexibility and 
balancing services, (e.g. Demand-Side Response (DSR), frequency 
response, storage, vehicle-to-grid, electrification of heat) that are key 
parts of a system integrating decentralised generation [20,21], there is 
an opportunity to expand the focus of future studies. Exploration of the 
above may also present opportunities to explore new forms of decen-
tralisation across different energy vectors and sector coupling. 
It is well established that the diffusion of decentralised energy 
technologies (e.g. small-scale wind, solar Photovoltaic (PV)) also cannot 
be separated from social, institutional, economic and cultural drivers 
and impacts. This paper therefore conceptualises energy decentralisa-
tion as a socio-technical transition [22,23]. 
Despite differing methods and foci, some common themes are iden-
tified by existing studies of energy decentralisation. Firstly, energy de-
centralisation takes different forms depending on the geographic, socio- 
economic and temporal context in which it emerges [24–26]. Secondly, 
energy system centralisation and decentralisation and are not mutually 
exclusive or binary opposites; it is quite possible, or even likely that 
energy systems will combine elements of both [27]. We also identify a 
tendency towards certain fable-like [6] narratives, in which physical 
decentralisation is assumed or expected to lead naturally to certain so-
cial or environmental goals. 
For example, a link is sometimes assumed between the technological 
shifts inherent in energy system decentralisation and similar shifts in 
norms, rules and institutions; albeit with institutional change tending to 
take place through gradual processes [28–30]. However, in addition to 
habituation as individual behaviour changes to accommodate changes in 
a technological context [31], institutional change is contextually shaped 
as a product of complex power dynamics and system characteristics [3, 
32–36]. We therefore question the degree to which institutional change 
is influenced by technological change, over and above other contextual 
factors. 
Similarly, energy system decentralisation is often strongly implied to 
link with democratic processes and outcomes, although these assump-
tions are not universal [for example 12,29,30. These analyses provide 
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useful conceptual tools for inquiry into the depth and meaning of 
democratisation in the context of energy decentralisation. However, to 
date, this approach has been applied to a limited number of test cases. 
We contribute to a developing area of literature through critical analysis 
of democratisation across three international case studies. Our analysis 
contends that, while decentralisation and democratisation can work 
together, it is not possible to assume any inherent relationship. 
Finally, decentralised technologies and decarbonisation targets are 
often assumed to be strongly linked. While decentralised energy gen-
eration can facilitate system decarbonisation, for example through 
increased deployment of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and flex-
ibility [21], decentralisation pathways encompass a wider web of social 
and economic relations intertwined with technological change. A less 
centralised system is not, therefore, necessarily a lower-carbon system. 
Our analysis examines actor engagement with decarbonisation as an 
explicit driver of energy decentralisation, noting substantial variability 
across and within case studies. 
3. Approach to analysis 
As outlined above, the observable phenomenon of energy decen-
tralisation represents the interaction of numerous processes of change, 
both social and technical. A great variety of approaches can be taken to 
the analysis of such socio-technical change. Numerous and diverse 
conceptual frameworks and heuristics have been created or adapted to 
order data, structure analysis and offer researchers the benefit of others’ 
insights when planning or conducting empirical research [37]. Latterly, 
research in this area has expanded its focus to include important areas of 
politics, discourse and institutional change, into which we offer this 
contribution [38–41]. We argue that processes of energy system de-
centralisation are best conceptualised as a distinct class of 
socio-technical transition [22,23,42]. We take the socio-technical tran-
sition – or the bundle of processes it represents - to be our primary unit of 
analysis. Therefore, we address the comparative analysis of decentrali-
sation pathways through the lens of the socio-technical transitions 
literature. Specifically we apply the ‘pathway’ typology put forward by 
Geels & Schot [23], subsequently somewhat reformulated and broad-
ened to give greater consideration to issues of actor agency by Geels 
et al. [42]. 
Geels et al. [42] draw on earlier work3 to derive four ‘ideal-type’ 
pathways along which a socio-technical transition may proceed.4 The 
four pathways are characterised by differentiation in three broad 
analytical categories: i) actors, for example, the struggle between new 
entrants and incumbent firms, but also the activity of other social groups 
or citizens; ii) the existing and emerging technologies that constitute 
the system; and iii) rules and institutions, with a fairly narrow focus on 
the formal rather than cultural-cognitive institutions and a differentia-
tion between incremental or disruptive institutional change. The four 
pathways proposed are:  
 Substitution in which incumbent actors are either overthrown by 
new firms, displaced by organised groups such as communities or 
social movements, or are replaced by outside firms. Substitution 
often involves substitution of existing technology with radical or 
innovative alternatives. Institutional change can be either incre-
mental, as new firms and/or technologies conform to existing rules, 
or transformative with the creation of new rules and institutions to 
accommodate the new actors and technologies. 
 Transformation in which incumbent firms shape change by adopt-
ing new practices and patterns, either incrementally or profoundly. 
In the transformation pathway, existing technologies may be incre-
mentally improved, complemented by additive innovation or even 
partially or fully replaced. Institutional change can be incremental or 
substantial. 
 Reconfiguration in which incumbents and new entrants form alli-
ances leading to initially modest or additive technical innovation. 
This triggers a process which, over time, leads to larger and more 
wide-spread innovation. Depending on the type of technical inno-
vation, the consequences can be incremental or substantial institu-
tional change.  
 De-alignment and re-alignment in which incumbents fail to adapt 
to changing contextual conditions, leading to collapse or withdrawal, 
opening up space for new entrants. In this pathway, new technolo-
gies enter the void left behind and compete for dominance. In-
stitutions are consequently disrupted and replaced. 
One notable characteristic of the pathways above is that in all but 
one of the four, changes in institutions and rules may be either incre-
mental or substantial. Here Geels et al. [42]turn to the political science 
literature on institutional change to offer a more fine-grained differen-
tiation of the nature and rate of change, in particular they cite the work 
of Kathleen Thelen [29]. As outlined above, energy decentralisation is 
likely to be characterised by institutional change. Therefore differenti-
ation between, and comparison of, decentralisation processes can be 
expected to require a clear view on institutional change. 
Among the numerous insights emerging from the diverse literature 
addressing institutional change is that, rather than the somewhat rare 
event of direct replacement of one institutional form with another 
following disruption by an external event, institutions more often 
change through the reconfiguration or repurposing of existing structures 
through incremental processes such as ‘bricolage’ or ‘translation’ [43, 
44]. As noted by Geels et al. [42], for Thelen [29], rules and institutions 
can be subject to gradual, path dependent change in which new insti-
tutional elements are added over the top of the original configuration 
with little fundamental change in purpose or mission: a process known 
as ‘layering’. Alternatively, changing local context may produce an 
adaptive but not strategic response of modest, ad hoc alteration known 
as institutional ‘drift’. Other modes of incremental change described by 
Thelen [see 32include ‘conversion’, the ‘redeployment or reinterpreta-
tion of existing elements of an institution for new purposes’ via reor-
ientation of their objectives [28,30] and ‘displacement’ whereby ‘new 
models emerge and diffuse’ to replace pre-existing institutions [45]. 
Drawing on the approach set out in this section, the primary research 
questions addressed in the remainder of this paper are “what types of 
transition pathways are represented by different examples of energy 
decentralisation?“, “what are the associated institutional changes and 
limitations?“, and “what can this tell us about decentralisation more 
generally?“. 
4. Three enactments of decentralisation 
Rather than attempting to represent the full variety of decentralisa-
tion pathways, our intention is to examine diversity within a 
geographically, technically, commercially and institutionally varied, but 
otherwise comparable, set of case-studies [46]. Firstly, all case studies 
are taken from countries with high national GDP and per-capita income 
[47] with established energy systems. Secondly, the national gover-
nance models of all case study countries can be broadly identified as 
liberal-democratic, and ensure at least some opportunity for public 
participation in energy policy-making at various levels of governance. 
Finally, all case study countries are signatories of the Paris Agreement on 
climate change [48] and have developed national carbon-reduction 
plans or targets [49–51], albeit with different levels of change 
required to meet those targets. The cases are: 
3 Itself based on interpretations of insights from Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), evolutionary economics, the neo-institutional tradition of orga-
nisation studies, and social field theory.  
4 These pathways are designed to conceptualise socio-technical transitions in 
a broad sense, rather than those only within the energy system. 
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 A consumer trial of local energy trading in Cornwall, UK;  
 The boom in domestic scale solar PV and electricity storage uptake in 
Australia; and  
 The planned replacement of a single diesel-fuelled power station 
with distributed renewable electricity generation and flexible oper-
ation in Ushant, France. 
The three case studies are based primarily on analysis of documents 
retrieved from the websites of governments and other stakeholders, 
research articles, media reports and other publically available material. 
In addition, observational field work was carried out in the Australian 
States of Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia between 
February and March 2018, on the island of Ushant in November 2017, 
and in Cornwall, UK between June 2017 and May 2019. Where possible, 
citation is made of the original source of information. Collected data 
were coded and analysed using the themes developed in the preceding 
section. 
4.1. Cornwall local energy market project 
The Cornwall Local Energy Market (LEM) project is a three-year trial 
from 2017 to 2020 jointly funded through the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the vertically integrated energy pro-
ducer and retailer, Centrica. 
Cornwall is outperforming most local authorities in England and 
Wales in its renewable energy generation, currently ranking 4th out of 
56 county areas [52]. Cornwall has a total renewable capacity of around 
764 MW, of which 72% comes from solar (where the authority is ranked 
2/56) and 17% comes from onshore wind [52]. The local government 
(Cornwall Council) has set ambitious targets for 2030 which include 
meeting 100% of Cornwall’s electricity demand from renewable and low 
carbon sources; increasing the proportion of Cornwall’s generation that 
is owned locally to 50% and increasing the proportion of Cornwall’s 
energy ‘spend’ retained within the local economy to 30% [53]. 
However, increasing penetration of renewable energy generation is 
stressing the distribution network, constraining further growth [54]. 
This is particularly affected by the Distribution Network Operator’s 
(DNO)5 principle of Last In, First Out (LIFO) [55]; determining that 
generation assets last to connect to the distribution network will be 
curtailed first during times of system stress. 
In order to overcome the lack of network capacity, Centrica has 
developed the Cornwall LEM as a local experiment in intelligent man-
agement of demand, generation and storage in a constrained part of the 
distribution network. The core of the trial is an online platform through 
which the DNO can request, and the local energy market can provide, 
flexible demand, generation and storage as required to alleviate system 
stress. In addition, the platform enables the trading of energy and flex-
ibility into established national markets such as ancillary services, 
balancing and wholesale markets. 
The LEM trial however, is revealing the extent to which existing rules 
and institutions in the UK inhibit greater local trading of power and 
flexibility [56]. UK markets and network operation have historically 
been designed to reflect the ‘conventional’ centralised configuration of 
the system, rather than supporting smaller scale, more active local 
participation. Despite some recent changes to ease access to ancillary 
services and the balancing market for smaller generators, this remains 
the case. For example, electricity market rules such as the length of the 
trading period (currently 30-min blocks) and minimum load size 
(currently 1  MWh) are not conducive to small scale or domestic-level 
participation, often using variable generation [56]. 
The LEM trial also aims to develop ‘peer-to-peer’ (P2P) trading of 
energy between Cornish residents and businesses. The P2P element of 
the trial differs to the demand response offering in that rather than 
network operators requesting local resources to meet individual grid 
requirements; P2P aims to balance local supply and demand in real-time 
through the trading of electricity within a peer group. 
The concept of P2P energy trading first emerged in the US, where it is 
more commonly known as ‘transactive energy’; but has now gained 
traction in Europe under various titles such as ‘community self-con-
sumption’ in France and ‘tenant self-consumption’ in Germany [57]. 
However, since privatisation in the late 1980s, electricity supply 
companies in the UK have acted as the core intermediary between cus-
tomers and the energy system, in what is known as the ‘supplier hub’ 
model. The current market arrangements have evolved and developed 
around this principle and the supplier’s role is now entrenched in legal 
frameworks, licensing arrangements, and industry codes, regulations 
and rules [58,59]. For instance, current legal arrangements mean that 
customers can contract with only one licensed supplier at any one time, 
effectively blocking electricity trading between peers as multiple, 
non-licensed supplier/generators. The existing rules therefore make the 
P2P proposition between generators and customers impossible to enact 
independently, since all transactions must be made through a third-party 
licensed supplier such as Centrica (who is also responsible for billing and 
settlement as well as supply). However, a ‘true’ P2P market could enable 
independent trading of local energy between participants. If technolo-
gies currently being tested in the LEM trial are considered to hold the 
potential for broader roll-out, these barriers raise questions both 
regarding the nature of future institutional change as well as the role and 
business model of actors such as Centrica and WPD. 
4.2. Booming distributed renewable electricity generation in Australia 
There are currently 1.8 million domestic solar (PV) installations in 
Australia, with the largest proportion of these (32% of households) in 
the states of South Australia and Queensland [60]. An average of the 
total of all of the Australian states in 2015, showed that just over 15% of 
Australian households had PV installed; double that of Belgium which 
had the next highest levels. The percentage of Australian households 
with PV installed rose even further to 23% by May 2017 [61]. 
The unexpectedly rapid installation rates of solar PV and domestic 
storage in Australia can be explained by a combination of four main 
economic and institutional factors: (i) rising electricity prices between 
2010 and 2012 [62–64]; (ii) a parallel reduction in the cost of DER 
technologies [60,65]; (iii) generous government subsidies under 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reduction schemes for installing and generating 
DER [66]; and (iv) in 2016 a major storm which caused technical issues 
and initiated a large scale system blackout [67]. Different Australian 
states have Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) schemes, which have been reduced over 
time. In addition, FiT solar is supported by a federal government scheme 
(the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES)) which will run until 
2030 (Table 1) [49]. 
The high rate of uptake also contributed to falling installation costs 
as competition between solar installers allowed for efficiencies in 
installation techniques and Australia now has the lowest PV installation 
costs in the world [69]. High uptake has also meant that companies such 
as Tesla, Enphase and Sonnen are competing for the Australian storage 
market [70]. In response to the commercial opportunity presented by 
this growing Australian market, in late 2016  Tesla announced that they 
would be introducing their new Powerwall 2.0 home electricity storage 
product in Australia at the same price as the first iteration of the product 
[71]. This effectively halved the cost to the consumer of domestic 
electricity storage, given that the Powerwall 2.0 has twice the storage 
capacity of its predecessor. 
In some Australian states, installing PV plus domestic storage rapidly 
5 Western Power Distribution (WPD) is the DNO for Cornwall and a LEM 
project partner. 
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became competitive with grid supplied electricity (Fig. 1).6 The uptake 
in DER has also allowed for new entrants to the electricity space with IT 
platforms [72] and DER management solutions, such as Virtual Power 
Plants, beginning trials [73]. 
The amount of solar now on the grid has led to problems for the 
networks. Firstly, there are constraints on the distribution grid which 
was not designed for two-way flows of energy. Secondly. PV systems 
increase the voltage on the 11 kV line, which can lead to transformer 
malfunctions if the voltage regulation is incorrect. Finally, a high 
penetration of PV can also reduce the frequency of the network; some-
thing which could cause a black-out of the entire system. Without 
adjustment, there would be potential for the distribution of costs asso-
ciated with rectifying network problems to fall more heavily on house-
holds that do not have PV and storage installed. To address this, 
suppliers now charge a standing charge to customers so that PV and 
storage owners are seen to be paying their ‘fair share’. Another concern 
for the market operator is the visibility of DER. Currently, the reporting 
requirements of the national-level revenue support scheme mean that 
the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) has detailed informa-
tion about the size, location and density of nearly all PV installations, 
providing it with important operational data. The same is not true, 
however, for battery storage. As there are currently no certificate 
schemes or tariffs for household batteries, if a customer installs a battery 
it is, for operational purposes, invisible to AEMO. Forecasting grid de-
mand consequently becomes more difficult. 
The rapid nature of solar PV expansion in Australia is challenging 
existing institutional arrangements, and has led to changes in the 
governance of the electricity sector being proposed by various stake-
holders. This includes: changes in operational responsibility [74], a 
national register of small scale batteries and other DER [75], and limited 
changes to electricity market rules [76–80]. These changes have been 
needed to counter the challenges arising from the unexpected uptake of 
solar PV and domestic storage. However, they appear to be more of a 
reactive ‘add-on’ to the existing centralised arrangements than optimi-
sation for a more decentralised system. 
4.3. Local vs national enactment on the island of Ushant 
The French island of Ushant (Ouessant) is a small settlement in the 
North Atlantic approximately 20 km from the coast of mainland France. 
Part of the region of Brittany but with no physical connection to the 
mainland, Ushant is electrically as well as geographically isolated from 
the European continent [81]. Until recently, Ushant derived approxi-
mately 100% of its non-transport energy needs from diesel-fired elec-
tricity generation at a single central plant: an arrangement which has 
long been understood to be both economically and environmentally 
undesirable [82]. Consequently, several attempts have been made to 
reorient the island’s energy system towards one that is less centralised, 
more renewable and more flexible [81,82]. Despite some experimenta-
tion with wind energy in the 1980s, with no electrical connection to the 
transmission system of mainland France, until recently all electricity 
demand on the island was met from a single diesel fuel generation plant 
[83,84]. 
Ushant’s location offers strong potential for electricity from solar, 
tidal, and wind energy [85,86]. Beginning in 2009, the Regional Council 
of Brittany initiated a series of actions designed to reduce dependence on 
diesel for electricity generation by moderating energy demand and 
expanding the use of renewable energy technologies [87]. The current 
ambition is for 70% of the island’s electricity consumption to be sourced 
from renewables by 2020, rising to 100% by 2030 [88,89]. 
Electricity costs in Ushant are high and forecast to increase further 
[90]. However the current institutional context means that electricity 
prices faced by consumers remain the same as those experienced by 
mainland consumers with nationally regulated domestic tariffs7. The 
substantial difference is made up by a general levy or surcharge on en-
ergy suppliers, effectively socialising costs among energy consumers 
[90,91]. One consequence of this arrangement is to make electricity the 
heating source of choice, since its subsidised price outcompetes im-
ported heating oil or other alternatives. Another is that consumers do 
not have financial motivation to drive a switch to renewables that might 
apply in other isolated locations with high energy costs [90,91]. 
The municipal agency Syndicat Departemental d’Energie et d’Equipe-
ment du Finistere (SDEF), which owns the distribution network, is legally 
responsible for the provision of energy services, and has a mandate to 
improve the environmental performance of the assets under its stew-
ardship [89,92]. However, the current institutional arrangement means 
that virtually all distribution services such as network operation, 
maintenance, and expansion are conducted on a concession basis in 
which long term contractual arrangement places responsibility for large 
parts of the electricity system on a concession holder. 
Table 1 
FiT rates for NEM states (2017). (*The mandatory minimum is the minimum 
Feed-in-Tariff rate that the retailer can provide). Data sourced from Ref. [68].  
STATE Scheme Rate c/kWh Max size 
Queensland South-eastern QLD: no 
minimum 
Rural QLD: mandatory 
minimum 







benchmark range for 
retailers 









Victoria Mandatory minimum* 11.3 <100 kW 
South Australia No minimum Depends on 
retailer: currently 
6-12 
First 45  kWh 
per day 
Tasmania Set rate 7 10 kW single 
phase 
30 kW three 
phase  
Fig. 1. Comparison of retail electricity prices in the National Energy Market 
(NEM) states (SA, TAS, VIC, ACT, QLD, NSW) and solar PV/Storage system costs 
in 2016. 
6 Cost of a solar/storage system (based on Powerwall 2.0 cost) assuming lifespan 
of 10 years for both (after 10 years costs drop to $0), costs for PV taken from 
Ref. [111] and solar resource and household electricity use for each of the capital 
cities calculated for each of the NEM states taken from Refs. [112,113]. No 
allowance has been made for FiT payments to give an idea of the economics of 
disconnecting from the grid. 7 Eurostat table nrg_pc_204. 
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Many of the firms operating in the French energy sector, such as the 
transmission system operator, Reseau de Transport d’Electricite (RTE), 
and the largest distribution operator, Enedis, are 100% owned by state- 
owned monopoly Electricite de France (EDF) [93]. For example, Enedis 
currently holds the Ushant distribution network concessions (expiring in 
2023) [94]. EDF, through one of its other subsidiaries, also owns the 
Ushant central electricity generation plant and is responsible for oper-
ating, developing, and ensuring the security of the electricity system in 
line with the same regulatory requirements as on the mainland [95]. 
Over recent years, there has been a growing impetus for change in 
Ushant’s electricity system. In response to the regional government’s 
plans for expanded use of renewables [87], the departement, through 
SDEF and the non-profit Association Iles du Ponant (AIP) [96], has pur-
sued various options for improving energy efficiency and expanding 
renewable distributed generation. A 54  kWh solar PV array was recently 
installed on the roof of a municipally owned sports centre by SDEF, and 
energy efficiency in Ushant has been somewhat improved [88]. In 
partnership with a number of business development associations, part of 
the strategy has been to couple energy system change with local eco-
nomic benefits, especially the attraction of new entrants to the island 
economy [97]. 
However, SDEF and AIP have faced significant challenges in these 
endeavours. Firstly, it is apparent from fieldwork that the syndicat lacks 
the technical and material resources required to analyse, identify and 
implement solutions, requiring participation in EU-funded programmes 
to gain access to expertise. Secondly, local actors reports that where 
progress has been made it has generally without the support of the na-
tional energy companies which are at best indifferent to and at worst 
actively resistant to the aims of a decentralised, locally managed elec-
tricity system. SDEF and its partners have, for example, found it 
impossible to obtain even the most basic technical specifications and 
plans of the distribution network of which they are the legal owners. 
Meanwhile, actors from outside have made substantial progress. In 
2015, 2 km from Ushant, a prototype 1 MW tidal stream energy con-
version device manufactured by Breton company Sabella was installed 
in 55 m of water in the Fromveur Passage, leading to some supply of 
electricity to Ushant [98–101]. In parallel to, but with no reference to 
the local and community-led efforts to reconfigure the electricity system 
on Ushant, the incumbent utility company has also made its own moves 
towards increasing the flexibility of the Ushant system by installing a 
large electrical storage device on the island [102,103]. 
Building on these efforts, in 2017 a consortium including a major 
French renewable energy developer (Akuo), a Breton marine energy 
technology company (Sabella), and EDF announced that they had 
secured funding from the French central government to design and 
implement a multi-turbine tidal energy array alongside new onshore 
renewables and electrical storage. This was perceived as something of a 
fait accompli from the perspective of other groups seeking a community- 
led approach to electricity decentralisation [104]. 
5. Discussion 
This section employs the Geels et al. analytical framework outlined 
in section 3 to explore our decentralisation case studies in relation to 
transition pathways, and examines presumptions about alignments be-
tween decentralisation, democratisation, decarbonisation and institu-
tional change. 
5.1. Which pathway? 
At present, there is notable variation in the pathway of each indi-
vidual case study, as categorised according to the typology put forward 
by Geels et al. [42] as shown in Table 2. It should also be noted that as 
processes described in the case studies remain ongoing, leaving potential 
for pathway-switching in the future. 
The Australian case provides a glimpse of steps along a possible 
substitution decentralisation pathway whereby incumbent actors are 
replaced or displaced by other actors. Storage firms such as Tesla can be 
observed playing the ‘disruptor’ role for which Silicon Valley technology 
companies have become synonymous [105], after a boom in solar PV 
uptake attracted sudden entry into the market of affordable in-home 
electricity storage. Energy consumers meanwhile, motivated by 
apparent concerns about electricity costs and reliability, took the op-
portunity to reduce their reliance on incumbent suppliers. With the rise 
of affordable storage, an increasing number of households - as many as 1 
in 8 new installations in 2017 [74] - are also going one step further, 
installing both solar PV and battery storage that achieves near total 
levels of electricity self-sufficiency. 
At its current stage of development the Cornwall case sits between 
two different pathways; displaying features of both without clear indi-
cation as to whether they are in competition or supporting co- 
development. On one hand there are elements of a local reconfiguration 
pathway present, particularly in the changing role of Centrica. Firstly, 
Centrica is playing a new coordinating role in the LEM trial. Secondly, 
Centrica has formed new relationships with a more diverse group of 
smaller actors, including start-up companies such as LO3 Energy [106], 
in order to access technologies and skills not currently held ‘in house’. 
On the other hand the transformation pathway describes the reor-
ientation of incumbent actors toward radical niche-innovations and new 
business models through diversification of their core business. This 
pathway perhaps better encompasses changes within a wider spectrum 
of incumbent actors who are LEM project partners; including Centrica, 
WPD and National Grid. It may also offer insights as to why these actors 
are proactively embracing a trial which presents an opportunity to shape 
change around emerging technologies and markets. 
Finally, in Ushant there appear to be two pathways competing to 
emerge. The first is a local reconfiguration pathway in which local de-
mands for change prompt incumbents such as SDEF and AIP to seek 
alliances with new entrants to the Ushant energy system, adding new de- 
centralised technologies and incremental change in institutions and 
rules. However, at the same time (or possibly in response), a process of 
transformation is sought by the incumbent energy utility in which radical 
new technology is implemented with little need to change existing in-
stitutions or involve local stakeholders. That the reconfiguration pathway 
is struggling to emerge is likely due to the territorial and jurisdictional 
nature of the governance arrangements. While demand for change and 
the desire to engage new entrants in the process was present at a local 
level, the capacity of local actors to effect meaningful institutional 
change is sharply constrained by both the dearth of resources and the 
universal remit of the national and regional level actors. 
5.2. Shifting rules and institutions 
All three case studies demonstrate incremental change in rules and 
institutions. However, amongst the cases the reasons identified for 
incrementalism are largely context-specific, with limited cross-case 
similarities. Firstly, in the Cornwall case there may be limits to future 
institutional change. While dominant utility firm, Centrica is investing 
in the LEM trial, many of the institutional changes that would precipitate 
large-scale adoption of the kind of decentralised models under investi-
gation seem highly disruptive to incumbent suppliers’ (and DNOs’) 
Table 2 
A summary of the three case studies overall transition pathways.  
Case Study Overall transition pathway 
identified 
Form(s) of Institutional change 
identified 
Cornwall LEM Local reconfiguration/ 
transformation 
Incremental - layering and drift 
Australia Solar 
PV 
Substitution Incremental - layering 
Ushant Local reconfiguration/ 
transformation 
Incremental - layering  
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current business models. It seems likely therefore that incumbents are 
recognising the need to assess possible future pathways for their busi-
ness portfolios in light of anticipated institutional change. However, any 
institutional change that is happening certainly appears gradual; 
constituted by incremental and ad hoc adaptions to accommodate the 
growing level of distributed renewable generation or application of 
novel digital technology. As such, rather than the springboard for 
disruptive change, it may be more accurate to view the LEM trial in one 
of two lights. Firstly, the LEM could be considered an exercise in 
competence adding, rather than major reorientation. This aspect can be 
seen as limited institutional change, or ‘layering’, with an anticipation of 
‘drift’ once the outcomes of national-level initiatives on decarbonisation 
and future system operation cascading down from BEIS and Ofgem [20] 
have been implemented. Alternatively, one could take the view that 
incumbent companies’ proactive investment in the LEM is evidence of 
desire to actively steer change in a manner that they may consider 
workable. If this is the case then in future we may expect to see Centrica, 
and potentially other comparable companies, engage more deeply in 
processes of facilitating institutional change. In the Cornwall case, the 
potential for engagement relates specifically to local energy markets, 
however further research is required to determine whether similar 
processes may be happening in other areas of the energy system affected 
by technological change. 
In the Australia case, while subsidies for decentralised solar PV were 
initially centrally-led, the uptake of the technology was primarily 
consumer-led and vastly exceeded expectations. From a consumer 
perspective, uptake was fuelled by falling technology costs and gov-
ernment subsidies, but also driven by a need to reduce household energy 
costs and secure energy supply. This is reflected in the main de-
mographic of purchasers being in the low to middle income level, or 
those who were asset rich but cash poor, such as retirees [107]. Insti-
tutional change following in the wake of the boom is, in general, modest 
layering in which the new participants must ‘fit and conform’ to the 
institutional environment. New rules, addressing concerns about the 
operation of a network in which large volumes of electricity are gener-
ated and stored by households, are currently in the process of being 
decided. While there is an appetite for change from many stakeholders, 
current governance regulations are more suited to efficient running of a 
centralised system. This is causing barriers to more wide-ranging 
governance change that could potentially support deeper forms of en-
ergy decentralisation. 
Finally, Ushant provides a useful illustration of conflict between 
different territorial levels on the subject of energy system decentralisa-
tion. While dominant role of the national monopoly inhibits locally-led 
decentralisation efforts, the same monopoly is able to unilaterally 
introduce technical elements of decentralisation ‘over the heads’ of the 
affected community. Simultaneously, the national-level system of con-
sumption subsidy through tariff levelisation prevents island residents 
from experiencing the ‘underlying’ economic cost of the existing system, 
potentially enhancing the dominance of status-quo actors such as EDF. 
As highlighted in the table and analysis above, institutional change 
across all cases is characterised primarily by layering and in one case also 
by drift. These forms of change represent the most incremental varieties, 
tending to remain closer to existing rules and institutions that alterna-
tive process of displacement or conversion [30]. This is a striking finding, 
as the case studies demonstrate very different levels of technological 
disruption; from widespread change in Australia through to predomi-
nant continuity in Ushant. Institutional inertia is potentially a sign of 
policy playing ‘catch-up’ with technological advance, rather than acting 
as a facilitator for effective development, use and coordination of 
emerging technology and supporting infrastructure. While this area re-
quires further research, it perhaps offers a warning to policymakers in 
other fields experiencing disruption; particularly emerging areas of en-
ergy system digitalisation. 
The contradictions and conflicts identified above complicate as-
sumptions that decentralisation will automatically lead towards changes 
in rules and institutions that are positive for other normative goals in the 
energy system. Rather, these case studies have highlighted how re-
lationships between different actors and technologies have the potential 
to constrain, shape, or sidestep, change. 
5.3. Pathways to … where? 
Turning to the concept of energy democratisation, both the Cornwall 
and Australia cases illustrate growth in the number of decentralised 
actors and practices active at the domestic level of the energy system. 
Here the energy systems change to engage a more ‘diverse participatory 
collective’ [107 p205] of SMEs and households that are both producers 
and consumers of energy (prosumers), as well as traders in the case of 
the Cornwall LEM. Szulecki [2] p32] discusses how the prosumer figure 
has become an “idealized citizen of energy democracy”, creating asso-
ciated new political subjectivities that extend conceptions of energy 
democratisation beyond public participation in energy policy-making 
alone. This emergence of new, context-specific forms of prosumption 
in both case studies may initially suggest that processes of energy 
democratisation are taking place. However, the depth and focus of these 
processes is less clear. 
In both cases, narratives surrounding new prosumer households also 
foreground their role as economic actors. Much less is discussed with 
regards to prosumer agency in decision-making; particularly in terms of 
decisions that go beyond exercising consumer choice or participating in 
peer-to-peer trades. This is significant as it omits the opportunity for 
smaller actors to engage in participatory governance; a key part of 
Szulecki’s definition of energy democracy. For example, within the LEM 
case study Centrica is trialling a new means for smaller actors to access 
the electricity market, a route which has historically been reserved for 
large, centralised incumbents. However, Centrica retains the agency to 
determine how this market is designed; setting the ‘rules of the game’ 
albeit within the broader national policy and regulatory framework and 
defining the products that are to be purchased as well as who has access 
to this market. In this case new rules may be developed based on the 
results of the trial which increase domestic participation in a new form 
of ‘decentralised’ energy market. However, any changes seem likely to 
simultaneously allow Centrica to retain substantial aspects of a some-
what privileged position. This demonstrates the potential for distributed 
energy pathways to reproduce existing power dynamics, potentially 
limiting contribution to normative goals such as democratisation. This 
could itself be seen as a form a ‘regime resistance’ [108]. 
By contrast, the case study of Ushant portrays one instance in which 
there is explicit community interest in decision-making (i.e. in shaping 
the form of and rules governing island energy decentralisation), coupled 
with frustration that they do not have sufficient power to affect change. 
Despite this power imbalance between community and incumbent 
utility (EDF), elements of energy democratisation are arguably more 
clearly identifiable in this case study. Szulecki contextualises the 
emergence of energy democracy in a time period where mainstream 
models of democracy are being widely critiqued. This is resulting in new 
calls to amend deficits of democracy, accountability and justice in the 
energy sector which “was previously not seen as requiring public 
involvement, and was (is) most often depoliticized” [2] p27]. 
From this perspective, the explicit energy-politicisation of the Ushant 
community demonstrates processes of energy democratisation, despite a 
current lack of ‘success’ in gaining decision-making power. By contrast, 
case studies in Australia and Cornwall that demonstrate more extensive 
energy decentralisation involving a larger number of new energy actors 
may initially appear to hold significant democratic potential. However, 
the extent to which this may be exercised is currently largely limited to 
the economic realm; rendering participants more passive when it comes 
to their ability to shape broader normative questions and context of their 
participation in the energy system. 
Finally, decarbonisation features as a broad theme across the three 
case studies above, as they are all contextually informed by targets to 
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reduce power sector emissions. However, variation is displayed across 
and within case studies in terms of how different actors interact with 
decarbonisation; in some cases as a direct driver of innovation and in 
others as a more contextual informant of other technological and socio- 
economic change. A particularly diverse example of differing actor 
viewpoints is found in the case of Australia where, while incentives for 
solar PV installation are part of a national renewable energy strategy in 
conjunction with state-based schemes [49,68], the rationale given by 
household actors for installing solar PV is much broader; encompassing 
factors such as cost and reliability of supply. This suggests that, 
depending on contextual factors, energy decentralisation can be influ-
enced by a variety of drivers that can be, but are not necessarily, 
environmentally-motivated. In addition, it is also important to recognise 
why and how drivers of decentralisation differ amongst actors, even 
within the same case study. 
6. Conclusion 
It is clear that there is, and will likely continue to be, multiple and 
sometimes conflicting interpretations of what energy decentralisation is 
or should represent. Decentralisation has numerous dimensions and 
what can be described as decentralisation from one point of view may be 
quite the opposite from another. Much of this arises from the multitude 
of interrelated innovations, both social and technological, that can serve 
as actors/props within a diversity of decentralisation narratives. 
Nevertheless, the ‘decentralisation tendency’ across its numerous uses 
tends to be associated with particular, often normative, outcomes. 
The instances of ‘energy decentralisation’ examined in this article 
show that it can, but does not automatically, infer progress towards 
other normative goals within energy system change. Across case studies, 
transitions are happening in different ways, but the incremental nature 
of institutional change is a common theme. In the Australia and Corn-
wall cases, incremental change in rules and institutions contrasts strik-
ingly to substantial advancements in the technological aspects of 
decentralisation. This is potentially a sign of policy playing ‘catch-up’ 
with technological innovation, rather than acting as a facilitator for 
effective development and use of emerging technology. 
Energy democracy is, if it is to be genuinely democratic, necessarily 
‘political’ and thus unpredictable; allowing for competing visions of the 
meanings and goals ascribed to energy decentralisation, and creating the 
potential for the continual negotiation and co-creation of any number of 
decentralisation pathways to play out. The extension of agency to new 
sets of actors within nascent energy markets can be considered an in-
cremental step towards democratisation. However, as this agency is 
constrained by regime actors, a shift to democratisation as whole can be 
overstated. A key part of any meaningful concept of energy democrat-
isation is the extension of rights and responsibilities to shape the rules of 
the game; not solely granting more actors more ‘plays’. 
However, this is not to suggest that incremental decentralisation is 
necessary slow. The urgency implied by the need to decarbonise energy 
systems, reflected in policies at all levels of governance, means that the 
energy-political context in the locations studied here is changing 
rapidly. Furthermore, the interplay between multiple, concurrent and 
complementary innovations, and the coevolution between this innova-
tion ecosystem and energy-political contexts, offers potential for rates of 
change that exceed what has been witnessed in historic energy transi-
tions [109]. In at least one of the cases above, experimentation by 
regime actors appears to be accelerating change through the active 
search for and experimentation with synergistic innovations, packaging 
them up to overcome specific local challenges. Importantly, these 
challenges are increasingly relating not only to the decarbonisation and 
decentralisation of electricity, but concurrent shifts towards low carbon 
and local heat and transport infrastructures. 
In playing key roles in decentralised innovation experiments, regime 
actors are both actively and passively shaping what form of decentral-
isation ‘works’ in specific contexts. If we acknowledge that such 
appropriation affords actors power over the future rules and institutions 
of the energy system, there is an implied tension between forms of de-
centralisation based on technological innovation, and forms that 
emphasise the dispersed participation and decision-making commonly 
assigned to concepts of energy democracy. 
The four pathways of socio-technical change proposed by Geels et al. 
provide some traction in the comparative analysis of energy decentral-
isation. In particular, by emphasising the path dependent and incre-
mental nature of institutional change, the framework highlights 
consideration of the regulatory complexity that characterises much of 
the electricity system. However, to understand energy decentralisation 
more fully, a clearer specification would be useful in two areas. 
First is the relative position of actors. The Geels et al. pathway 
framework allows for actors to be either ‘incumbents’ (itself somewhat 
loosely defined [110]) or new entrants (from within the system itself, or 
incumbents from other sectors). However, in the particular case of en-
ergy decentralisation, technical systems are highly stratified (into elec-
tricity distribution or transmission levels, for example), and shifting 
territorial roles may be the focus of institutional change. As such, a 
greater focus on actor positionality allowing differentiation between, for 
example, types of incumbent or new entrant could be a valuable clari-
fication. Similarly, the framework, being based on theoretical insights 
built on historical observation, does not allow for the effective assess-
ment of pathways against some of the normative goals discussed in this 
paper. The same perhaps applies to the inherently dynamic nature of the 
multiple innovations and actors involved in whole system trans-
formation. Questions about which actors, enacting which types of de-
centralisation pathways, lead most reliably to preferred goals remain 
open. 
Finally, while it falls outside the scope of this paper to prescribe a 
recipe for energy decentralisation, it is notable that none of the four 
pathways in the framework appear to ‘fit the bill’; suggesting that they 
are non-exhaustive and do not encompass all possibilities. In particular, 
more work is needed to understand the ability of public actors such as 
communities, regulators and policymakers at all levels to overcome 
some of the limits to rapid institutional change Geels et al. describe. 
More research in this area may reveal other pathways or alternative 
patterns of democratic energy decentralisation, and provide insights 
about how existing tools of governance can be used now to shape them 
for the future. 
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